Both competencies are the application of multiple elements of combat power in unified action, otherwise known as combined arms maneuver.Įver since Germany developed the concept of integrated weapons and arms, this theory of warfare has been sustained in some form or fashion by the US Army. To achieve its position of relative advantage, the US Army utilizes its core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Unified land operations is the new name of a historical theory of warfare in use since Germany employed it during World War II. The implicit theory of warfare identified in ADP 3-0 is a continuation of combined arms warfare to achieve decisive victory over a perceived threat. ADP 3-0 describes a collective and diverse group of threats that includes a “combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and criminal elements.” Based on a complex, varied environment with conventional and unconventional threats, the US Army referred to the past for its theory of warfare. A similar theme is present in ADP 3-0’s characterization of the threat. The lack of any specific geographic area or environment implies that the US Army expects to fight anywhere. ADP 3-0 applies the same construct to determine its theory of war.ĪDP 3-0 implies that the US Army expects to operate in a diverse range of operational environments. Moltke’s strategic envelopment concept was a new theory of warfare that favored armies that converge quickly, engage an enemy from multiple flanks, and subsequently envelopment an enemy in decisive battle. Comparable to when Helmuth von Molkte the Elder examined Prussia’s operational environment of multi-front conflict, technological advances in firepower, and extended battle frontage, he developed a new theory of warfare to adapt to a new environment. This includes where and whom the US Army thinks it will fight. To determine the US Army’s theory of warfare as identified in ADP 3-0, it is necessary to review how the US Army views the operational environment. Regardless of the operational environment the US Army will confront, its theory of war as identified in ADP 3-0 places the primacy of policy first. ADP 3-0 implicitly acknowledges the use of the Army in limited conflicts for limited aims. The term win is not even used in ADP 3-0 unified land operations “describes how the Army gains and maintains positions of relative advantage” in all described scenarios. Criteria under the Weinberger-Powell doctrine such as sufficient force for the intention of winning and the use of force as a last resort are not even remotely mentioned in ADP 3-0. Īrguably, ADP 3-0 and its fundamental theory of war is a complete repudiation of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. All aligned under and integrated with joint or multinational elements for the use of policy aims. The US Army is not limited to just prevailing in war, but performs a wide range of operations under the umbrella of unified land operations. As described in ADP 3-0 war is only one component of unified land operations. The underlying theory of war as implied in ADP 3-0 is the continuation of Clausewitz’s theory of war and that war is “but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” Using the Clausewitzian theory of war as a lens to analyze ADP 3-0, the assessment of ADP 3-0 is that unified land operations have replaced war as the continuation of policy with other means. Unfortunately, based on the US Army’s theory of war and warfare, they have incorrectly described operational art and the relationship between unified land operations, operational art, and strategic aims. In spite of this exclusion, a further review of ADP 3-0 reveals that the US Army did have an implicit theory of war and warfare that underlines ADP 3-0. This omission in conjunction with a new doctrinal concept for the execution of operational art creates confusion and ambiguity on the role of operational art and its relationship to unified land operations. ADP 3-0 attempts to provide the future framework for the range of military operations the US Army expects to conduct, but without the explicit reference to the nature of war and the character of warfare. ADP 3-0 is the capstone publication of US Army doctrine that provides the common operational concept for the use of Army forces. ADP 3-0: A Theory of War Disconnected from Operational ArtĪ great source of frustration when reading current US Army doctrine, specifically Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 Unified Land Operations, is the lack of a definitive characterization of the theory of war and warfare.
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